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Abstract 
 
The aim of the experiment reported here was to investigate the processes 
underlying the construction of truthful and deliberately fabricated memories.  
Properties of memories created to be intentionally false – fabricated memories – were 
compared to properties of memories believed to be true – true memories. Participants 
recalled and then wrote or spoke true memories and fabricated memories of everyday 
events.  It was found that true memories were reliably more vivid than fabricated 
memories and were nearly always recalled from a first person perspective.  In 
contrast, fabricated differed from true memories in that they were judged to be 
reliably older, were more frequently recalled from a third person perspective, and 
linguistic analysis revealed that they required more cognitive effort to generate.  No 
notable differences were found across modality of reporting.  Finally, it was found 
that, intentionally fabricated memories were created by recalling and then ‘editing’ 
true memories.  Overall, these findings show that true and fabricated memories 
systematically differ, despite the fact that both are based on true memories. 
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One of the functions of memory is in imagining. Imagining, for example, how 
the future might be or how the past might have been otherwise. Indeed, memory and 
imagining are so interconnected it has been suggested that together they form a 
remembering-imagining system (Conway, 2009). Although much research has 
focused on the association between imagining the future and autobiographical 
memory (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; 
Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; 
Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003; Schacter & Addis, 2009; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 
2008; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008; Tulving, 1985; Tulving, 2002), little research 
has investigated our ability to imagine an alternative past. Therefore, in the present 
study we directly compare intentionally fabricated autobiographical memories 
(IFAMs) with autobiographical memories (AMs) the rememberer believes to be true 
and which they experience as memories. An IFAM is an entirely or partially 
fabricated memory, consisting primarily, but not exclusively of false facts, as 
opposed to the expression of false opinions or beliefs (see Newman et al., 2003, for 
differences in false opinions).   IFAMs may arise in forensic contexts, and become 
particularly pivotal in instances when memory is the only form of evidence available.  
The sorts of cases in which  memories are the  only evidence include, what in the UK 
are termed, cases of ‘historic’ sexual abuse (typically memories dating to childhood 
recalled by an adult complainant), accident assessments, war, torture, political 
asylum, and plagiarism.  Moreover, reports of fabricated memories  are a common 
feature of forensic interviews and interrogations  (Porter & Yuille, 1996, Porter, 
Yuille and Lehman, 1999) and a number of reasons and motivations for deliberately 
fabricating memories may exist including revenge, control and monetary gain 
(Yuille, Tymofievich, & Marxsen, 1995). 
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However, a small body of work has begun investigating IFAMs, with particular focus 
falling on systematic differences between real and fabricated memories (Conway, 
Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross, & Sharpe, 2003; Merckelbach, 2004; Porter, Peace, & 
Emmett, 2007; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999),  Although little empirical work has 
investigated the construction processes of IFAMs, it has been suggested that an 
IFAM is created by means of a ‘lie script’ .  According to this view, a generic 
representation of an event is generated and is then used in place of a specific memory 
of a single event.  A process that has been termed ‘superficial encoding’ (Porter & 
Yuille, 1996).  This theory has had some support, (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003) and has led to the view that truth tellers create 
their accounts through reconstruction, whereas liars attempt to accurately repeat a 
previously rehearsed script.  According to these theories, it is  these differences in 
processing and storage that are responsible for systematic and measureable 
differences in in truthful and fabricated memory accounts (Colwell, Hiscock-
Anisman, Memon, Taylor, & Prewett, 2007). 
   
Porter (1998) further suggests that verbal ideas and images may play a role in 
IFAM generation, arguing that fabricated memories are “imaginative constructions”.  
However, Porter (1999), later, proposed that fabricated memories may not be entirely 
imaginative in nature, but like false memories (untrue memories that, unlike 
fabricated memories are not known to be false), may incorporate elements of an 
experienced event with the purpose of enhancing the credibility of an account.  In a 
rather similar and related way it has been suggested that the process of lying involves 
firstly accessing true beliefs followed by denial and/or distortion of these beliefs 
(Polage, 2004).  Despite this work, to our knowledge, no empirical research has 
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explicitly addressed the construction processes involved in IFAM construction (with 
the exception of Conway, et al., 2003).  Therefore, the primary aim of the present 
research is to understand the way in which IFAMs are constructed within the 
autobiographical memory system. By understanding such processes, we can better 
understand how IFAMs are stored, rehearsed and recalled, and why differences may 
occur in their content.  
 
The generation or construction of AMs involves the effortful, iterative, access 
of autobiographical memory knowledge structures and the gradual establishment of 
patterns of activation/inhibition across distributed neural networks that come to form 
an AM in an act of remembering (Cabeza & Jacques 2007; Conway, et al., 2003, 
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). It seems that the construction of IFAMs 
may involve similar processes, not least because the generation of IFAMs may 
feature the recall of AMs. It is difficult to conceive of a process of IFAM generation 
that did not feature, to a least some extent, access of autobiographical knowledge and 
possibly the generation of specific AMs. The present research is consistent with this 
and follows from the assumption that IFAM creation involves initially accessing 
information in long-term memory, followed by a conscious “editing” phase.  In other 
words, an AM is activated and then consciously edited to produce an IFAM.   
 
Some evidence supporting this assumption comes from an EEG study by 
Conway, et al., (2003) contrasting the construction and retention of IFAMs and AMs. 
In the construction phase no differences in activation were found between IFAMs and 
AMs and the patterns of activation were highly similar to those observed in a prior 
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study of AM generation (Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, & Whitecross, 2001) . However, in a 
retention phase during which IFAMs and AMs were held in mind for 10s a major 
difference did emerge and that was increased right frontal activation during IFAM 
retention. This may have reflected the editing of AMs and subsequent difficulties in 
consciously maintaining the novel IFAM representation. 
 
Because of the editing process, and effort required to maintain a novel 
representation, IFAMs should differ from AMs in some of their recollective qualities. 
For example, memories not based on real experience may be associated with less 
vivid mental imagery (Johnson & Raye, 1981), may be placed further back in the past 
to demonstrate a stable, long-held memory and may be recalled more frequently 
through an observer perspective, since an observer perspective has been shown to 
occur following distortion (Freud, 1915; Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  Further, AMs may 
require less cognitive effort to generate (Vrij, et al., 2008) and may also be faster to 
create.  We, therefore, expect to find linguistic constructs within accounts of IFAMs 
that are indicators of cognitive effort, for example fewer complex words e.g. those 
over six letters in length and a higher rate of non-fluencies, e.g. “erm”, “umm”, 
particularly for spoken accounts).  Further, we expect that IFAMs will contain more 
motion words, e.g. walk, go, run.  Motion words have been found to be a 
characteristic of increased cognitive effort, used by a rememberer to reduce the 
complexity of an account by referring to simple actions rather than expression of 
emotions or other metacognitive reasoning (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & 
Richards, 2003). Finally, IFAMs may be shorter in length than AMs to avoid 
unnecessary discussion of detail. 
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Additional linguistic differences such as an increase in negative emotion words, 
fewer exclusive and sensation words in IFAMs have been shown by Newman et al. 
(2003), however we did not expect to find these linguistic differences since our study 
was investigating fabricated memories rather than fabricated opinions and denials 
(Newman, et al. , 2003).  In summary then, four recollective qualities, vividness, 
memory / image generation times, retention interval, and perspective  and four 
linguistic constructs, complex words, non-fluencies, motion words and account 
length, all assumed to reflect cognitive effort and / or an editing process, were 
investigated. Accounts of the memories were recorded by either typing or by tape 
recording while they were spoken1.  
 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-six participants were recruited for the study (52 females and 
14 males).  Their ages ranged from 18 - 57 years, with a mean age of 21.  Forty-eight 
participants took part in the study for course credits as part of their undergraduate 
studies at The University of Leeds, and the remaining 18 participants received small 
payment.  
Figure 1 about here 
Materials and Procedure. Figure 1 shows the presentation order of cues and 
ratings for each trial of the study.  Participants were tested individually and all testing 
was completed using a computer.  Participants were presented with a computer 
screen displaying “RECALL” or “IMAGINE.”. Following this a cue was displayed, 
                                                 
1
 Differences were not expected between the two modalities but as witnesses usually speak their 
memories aloud it was thought that the two modalities should be contrasted.  
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e.g. going to a restaurant.  There were 20 cues naming common everyday activities, 
(taken from Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Trafimow & Wyer, 1993; Reiser, Black, 
& Abelson, 1985).  Cues were counterbalanced across participants and conditions, 
ensuring that all cues were used to generate both IFAMs and AMs.  One block of 10 
cues instructed the participant to recall, the other, imagine.    There was a short 2-
mimute pause between blocks while the instructions for the next block, which 
notified the participant of the final condition (AM or IFAM), were reviewed.  
Participants were instructed to generate either a truthful memory or imagine an event 
that had never occurred associated with the given cue.  They were then instructed to 
press the space bar once they had brought clearly to mind a memory or imagined a 
fabricated past event, there was no upper or lower time limit on memory retrieval / 
image generation.  Participants were instructed to ensure that they imagined all 
fabricated events being in the past and to describe them as if they were trying to 
convince another person that the event had actually been experienced.  For AMs they 
were instructed to bring to mind a memory of an event which they had directly 
experienced that had lasted for minutes or hours but no longer than one day. Both 
types of memory could be recalled or located at any point in their own personal past, 
they were not limited to specific time periods. Participants were instructed to 
construct memories as quickly as they could but to ensure they were specific.  
Memory retrieval and image generation times were recorded in milliseconds 
from cue on-screen to space bar press.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions and half typed a description of the memory into the computer and the 
other half spoke their memory into a Dictaphone. After a memory had been provided, 
participants rated the vividness of AMs and IFAMs using 7-point scales (1=low, 
7=high).  Participants also indicated the perspective or point-of-view in their 
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memory: they were instructed to judge a memory as having an ‘observer’ perspective 
if they saw themselves in the memory and to judge a ‘field’ perspective if they had 
something approximating to their original perspective or what would have been their 
original perspective for an IFAM. Finally, participants were asked to judge the 
approximate age at which the memory had occurred.  They were instructed to 
plausibly fabricate this for IFAMs. Lastly participants took part in short post-
experimental interviews in which they were asked how they had created their IFAMs. 
 
Results 
Table 1 about here 
Recollective Qualities. 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVAs, with two levels of memory 
reporting (typed vs spoken) and two memory types (AM vs IFAM) were conducted 
for three separate recollective qualities (vividness, memory retrieval / image 
generation time and retention interval).  A main effect of memory type was found for 
vividness, F(1, 64) = 27.2, MSe = 0.6, p < 0.001, η2  = 0.3 and retention interval, F(1, 
64) = 16.6, MSe = 2.1, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.2, indicating that AMs were reliably more 
vivid and had a reliably shorter retention interval, i.e. were more recent than IFAMs..  
Additionally, although IFAMs were found to take longer to generate than AMs, this 
difference was not reliable, most likely due to the large amount of variation in 
memory / image generation times. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations 
(in parentheses). To investigate the relationship between vividness and retention 
interval, separate correlation analyses of these variables were conducted.  Results 
showed that for AMs, age was reliably positively correlated with vividness (r=0.35, 
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p<0.001), such the more recent the memory the more vivid it was. No other reliable 
differences or correlations were found.  
Table 2 here 
Memory perspective was investigated using Chi-Square.  It was found that 76% 
of AMs had a field perspective (the participant sees the memory through their own 
eyes) and the remaining 24% had an observer perspective (the participant sees 
themselves in the memory).  For IFAMs 48% of imagined events had an observer 
perspective with 52% a field perspective.  These differences in perspective between 
AMs and IFAMs were found to be reliable overall, (X2(1) = 94.4, p<0.001).  
Content Analysis. Memory accounts were analysed for four predefined linguistic 
constructs: motion words, complex words, non-fluencies and account length for both 
AMs and IFAMs. The counts were made using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count, LIWC, program (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) and the totals for each 
memory in each of the IFAM and AM conditions were entered into separate 2 
(memory reporting) x 2 (memory type) ANOVAs. A main effect of memory type was 
found for motion words (F(1, 63) = 10.7, MSe = 0.6, p < 0.005, η2 = 0.1) and an 
interaction effect was found for non-fluencies (F(1, 64) = 15.0, MSe = 1.1, p < 0.001, 
η2 = 0.2). The means (see Table 1) indicated that accounts of IFAMs featured 
reliably more motion words than AMs and reliably more non-fluencies than AMs but 
only when the memory was spoken.  No other reliable differences were found. 
 
Finally, in the post-experimental interview, when asked how they had 
generated the fabricated memories, all participants stated that they had created their 
IFAMs either by recalling specific memories and editing them, or by recalling an 
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item of autobiographical knowledge and constructing a fabricated memory around it. 
Both strategies were common and most participants used both.  
 
General Discussion 
 
The present findings (Tables 1 and 2) show that IFAMs and AMs differ in 
important ways despite the fact that IFAMs are based on AMs or other 
autobiographical knowledge. Autobiographical memories were found to be more 
vivid and to date to more recent times than IFAMs. Importantly for AMs, but not for 
IFAMs rated vividness correlated with the recency of a memory and more recent 
AMs were judged more vivid. These differences and relations may reflect beliefs 
about memory (see Justice, Morrison, & Conway, 2012, for recent work on beliefs 
about memory). For example, a person might believe that the older a memory the 
more likely it is to be believed to be true. Possibly this is because it makes an IFAM 
appear more embedded in a person’s autobiographical memory. Or, perhaps, there is 
a belief too that an older memory has had more opportunities to be scrutinised and 
contradicted and so in a way its truth has been tested. Similarly, it may be the case 
that participants either implicitly or intentionally believe that claiming a memory is 
from further in the past makes it less likely that others will remember it themselves 
and/or search for verification. These beliefs may have led our participants to reliably 
date their IFAMs to more remote dates than their AMs. Interestingly, the correlation 
between vividness and recency of memory is probably not one that the general 
population is aware of and therefore it does not influence judgments of age of 
memory and vividness for IFAMs as it does for true autobiographical memories. 
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IFAMs were also found to take longer to generate than AMs.  Although this finding 
was not reliable, due to large variations in the data, it may nonetheless reflect 
additional processes occurring in IFAM generation, and that is, we suggest, a process 
of conscious ‘editing’, as the participants indicated in their post-experimental 
interviews. 
 
Undoubtedly one of the most important findings of the present study, shown in 
Table 2, are the differences in memory perspective between AMs and IFAMs. Here, 
AMs were strongly associated with a field perspective and this is surely what would 
be expected for memories of directly experienced events. The dominance of the field 
perspective in AMs only seems to diminish for negative emotional experiences 
(Freud, 1915; Nigro & Neisser, 1983) and when memory is incompatible with some 
aspect of the self (Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005). In these cases the observer 
perspective increases. For our participants, generating IFAMs that were intended to 
convince others that they were true, may have been rather similar to lying and that in 
itself may have been sufficient for them to distance themselves in their IFAMs and do 
so by taking an observer perspective. Whatever the case, the findings suggest that 
fabricated autobiographical memories are just as likely to have a field or observer 
perspective, whereas this is not the case for true autobiographical memories. As 
Freud (1915) originally noted, an observer perspective indicated a ‘memory’ that has 
been further processed or ‘edited’ after formation and that may then indicate, on at 
least some occasions, a fabricated memory. 
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Finally, it was observed that accounts of IFAMs contained more motion words 
and more non-fluencies. The increases in motion words and non-fluencies are 
considered to reflect increasing cognitive effort within an account or statement 
(Newman et al., 2003).We suggest this occurs for IFAMs relative to AMs in part 
because of the editing process and in part because holding a novel mental 
representation while describing it may be more cognitively effortful than describing a 
more permanent long-term memory representation. As regards the ‘editing’ process, 
although we did not formally test this, responses from the post-experimental 
interview indicated that this often took the form of ‘deletion-substitution’. For 
instance, the memory “Going the new Italian restaurant with X,Y, and Z, last 
Saturday” might be edited to “Going the usual restaurant with X,Y, and Z, last 
Saturday”. Clearly, such a process is in addition to retrieving the memory and 
therefore is more complex and effortful. Similarly, holding in mind, say, a visual 
image of an IFAM may require constant refreshing of the image to maintain the 
changed or substituted detail (Kossyln, 1983). Again making IFAM construction 
more effortful, increased effort that is subsequently reflected in the verbal account of 
the memory. 
 
Taken together, then, data from both recollective qualities and linguistics 
suggests a process of IFAM generation that is more effortful than AM generation. 
IFAMS are less vivid and less recent, and do not show a systematic relationship 
between vividness and age of memory. Most strikingly, however, intentionally 
fabricated memories are less likely than true AMs to have a field perspective and 
more likely to have an observer perspective. Further, they contain language that is 
representative of a reduction in cognitive complexity, such as an increase in the use 
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of motion words and an increase in the number of (spoken) non-fluencies.  These 
differences in characteristics of the two types of memories and in their verbal 
description reflect the differing cognitive processes underlying IFAM and AM 
generation, strengthening the argument that IFAMs are more effortful to generate due 
to an additional process of ‘editing’.   
The present experiment is the first to investigate the processes by which IFAMs 
are generated.  Understanding these processes is integral to future work investigating 
IFAMs and lying more generally.  Understanding the editing phase more fully i.e. 
deletion-substitution and other forms of editing, may lead to new ways to identify 
intentionally false autobiographical memories. It may also eventually indicate ways 
in which IFAMs become integrated with autobiographical memory over time, and, 
perhaps, with repeated rehearsal become indistinguishable from true autobiographical 
memories. 
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